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Stephen P. Mumme*

New Directions in

United States-Mexican
Transboundary Environmental
Management: A Critique of
Current Proposals
ABSTRACT
Recent proposalsfor reforming U.S.-Mexican transboundary
environmental management catalyzed by the North American Free
Trade Agreement negotiations departfrom conventional wisdom by
adopting a functional reduction approach to institutional change.
This paper evaluates these new proposals' accuracy in characterizing
the shortcomings of current management approachesand examines
the formal and political impediments to achieving recommended
changes in the present management regime. The analysis suggests
that the functional enhancement approachadopted by the new Integrated Border Environmental Plan represents a more realistic and
achievable approach to environmental management reform along the
border.
INTRODUCTION
1991 may well go down as a watershed in United States-Mexico
transboundary environmental management. Driven by intense debate
over a pending North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), both
governmental and non-governmental critics have generated more proposals for transboundary management reform than at any time in memory,
with potentially wide-ranging consequences for how the United States
and Mexico cope with shared environmental problems.
These reform initiatives are inspired by the debate on Fast Track
authorization in the spring of 1991, prefigured by the presidential summit
of November 1990 in which presidents Bush and Salinas respectively
promised to generate a comprehensive plan for managing the border envi*Professor of Political Science, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado; Ph.D.
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ronment. The political importance of that promise became apparent during the Fast Track debate, compelling the presidents to accelerate
development of the Integrated Border Environmental Plan (IBEP)1 as the
price to be paid for mollifying environmentalists. That promise, on May 1,
directly inspired the IBEP First Stage Draft Plan, promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Mexico's Secretaria de Desarrollo
Urbano y Ecologia (SEDUE) on August 1, 1991.2 The Draft Plan, in turn,
provided a formal opportunity for environmental non-governmental
organizations (ENGOs) to comment and advance alternative proposals.
This unprecedented set of political circumstances has attracted national
attention to transboundary environmental management as never before.
At present reading, half a dozen proposals, including those the
two governments placed on the table, have been advanced in one form or
another. While these proposals diverge on various questions, they each
contain recommendations for reforming the current bilateral regime for
managing United States-Mexican transboundary environmental problems. Both national and regional environmental organizations as well as
universities have participated in this process, including the Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC), the Sierra Club, the Texas Center for
Policy Studies (TCPS), the National Toxics Campaign (NTC), the Border
Ecology Project (BEP), and the Udall Center for Policy Studies at the University of Arizona, among others.
These proposals vary from the past in two important ways. First
they involve a wide range of players, and many nontraditional players, in
transboundary environmental policymaking. Second, the proposals themselves tend to advocate radical surgery on existing mechanisms of transboundary environmental management, some going as far as to
recommend wholesale reconstruction of the present transboundary environmental regime.
This paper examines these proposals with an eye to their institutional recommendations for border environmental management reform.
Several criteria are employed in evaluating these proposals. The recommendations in each proposal will be evaluated in terms of:
a. the accuracy of the proposal's characterization of current
flaws in the extant institutional framework;
b. formal barriers, statutory and treaty barriers, to the recommended change;
c. political barriers to the recommended change.
1. United States Environmental Protection Agency and Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano y
Ecologia, Integrated Environmental Plan for the United States-Mexican Border Area, First
Stage 1992-1994, Working Draft (1991).
2. Id.

Summer 19921

U.S.-MEXICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

Before proceeding, it must be acknowledged that such an evaluation cannot be made on strictly objective bases. The proposals themselves
strongly reflect normative values concerning preferred development alternatives and preferred institutional approaches. A critique of these alternatives must perforce reflect some preferences as well. The objective of this
paper, however, is not to moralize about the proposed recommendations,
but instead to subject the alternatives to a set of practical and political feasibility tests by way of identifying what is most useful and most strategically possible by way of institutional reform in binational environmental
management. The paper concludes with an admittedly biased, but hopefully useful, set of reflections on what avenues deserve pursuing as
ENGOs flex their muscles and try to shape the transboundary environmental agenda into the next century.
ENVIRONMENTALISTS' CRITIQUE OF THE
EXISTING MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
The joint EPA/SEDUE Border Plan initiative provoked by the
NAFTA debate has been instrumental in generating a number of proposals for reform by various environmental and public interest organizations.3 The critique of the present management regime on the United
States-Mexican border is wide ranging, addressing substantive issues as
well as institutional aspects of environmental management. In general,
the various critiques find considerable shortcomings in the current management regime. The twin cornerstones of the current bilateral management system, the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC)
and the 1983 United States-Mexico Border Environmental Cooperation
Agreement (BECA) are the principal targets of criticism.
Critique of the IBWC
The IBWC has taken the brunt of environmentalists' criticism of
the extant management approach. The Commission, which traces its roots
to earliest boundary commissions established after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, with modern foundation in the 1944 United StatesMexican Water Treaty, is the only officially constituted binational agency
with a mandate for resolving binational disputes over territorial limits,
water allocation, sewage and sanitation, and, arguably, water quality
3. S. Lewis, M. Kaltofen, & G. Ormsby, Border Trouble: Rivers in Peril (1991); M. Kelly, Facing Reality: The Need for Fundamental Change in Protecting the Environment along the
United States-Mexican Border (1991); H. Ingram, Integrated Environmental Plan for the Mexico-United States Border (1991); J. Ward, Comments of the Natural Resources Defense Council on the Integrated Environmental Plan for the United States-Mexico Border Area (1991); D.
Kamp, Testimony: EPA-SEDUE Integrated Border Environmental Plan Public Hearing, 1991.
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questions of a binational character.4 The Commission also enjoys limited
jurisdiction over groundwater allocation and, arguably, quality, under
Minute 242, a binational agreement of the IBWC reached in 1973.
The thrust of environmentalist criticism of the IBWC centers on 1)
its ambiguous mandate in the sphere of water quality management, 2)
perceived stodginess, or conservatism, in responding to environmental
pressures, 3) and the structure of its decisionmaking procedures and perceived resistance to participation and influence by environmental organizations. On the first point, for example, a National Toxic Campaign report
entitled Border Trouble: Rivers in Peril observes that in the sphere of water
quality regulation "the EPA has left virtually all monitoring and enforcement to state authorities or the IBWC." 6 The report goes on to note, "there
is considerable confusion and disagreement over what agency in the
United States bears the responsibility for addressing transboundary pollution." 7 Mary Kelly, Director of the Texas Center for Policy Studies,
observes, "it is unclear whether Article 3 of the 1944 Treaty, regarding 'border sanitation problems' gives the IBWC authority to deal with toxic
industrial or agricultural wastewaters that are not discharged through8 a
sewage system, since 'sanitation' generally refers to domestic sewage."
Criticism of the Commission has also centered on the second
point, the issue of its responsiveness to water quality problems. According
to the National Toxics Campaign, "activists and state officials along the
border have become increasingly frustrated by the lack of federal intervention. State officials assert that these pollution problems have become
too large for local authorities to handle. And remarkably, when state officials do attempt to engage in surveillance of pollution that originates

4. For background on the IBWC see: Eldrige, A Comprehensive Approach to United States
Mexico BorderArea Water Management, 4 S.W. Rev. Mgmt. & Econ. 89-101 (1985); J. Mueller,
Restless River: InternationalLaw and the Behavior of the Rio Grande (1975); Timm, Some Observations on the Nature and Work of the InternationalBoundary and Water Commission, United States
and Mexico, 15 Soc. Sci. Q. 1 (1932); Jamail and Mumme, The InternationalBoundary and Water
Commission as a Conflict ManagementAgency in the United States-Mexico Borderlands,19 Soc. Sci.
J. 45 (1982); Mumme, Regional Power in National Diplomacy: The United States Section of the
InternationalBoundary and Water Commission, 14 Publius 115 (1984); Mumme, Engineering
Diplomacy: The Evolving Role of the InternationalBoundary and Water Commission in United
States-Mexico Water Management, 1 J. of Borderlands Stud. 73 (1986); Mumme & Moore,
Agency Autonomy in TransboundaryResource Management: The United States Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico, 30 Nat. Resources J. 661
(1990); Piper, Two InternationalWaterways Commissions: A Comparative Study, 6 V. J. Int'l. Law
98 (1965); Smedresman, The InternationalJoint Commission (United States and Canada)and the
InternationalBoundary and Water Commission (United States and Mexico): Potentialfor Environmental Control Along the Boundaries,6 N.Y.U. 1. Int'l. L. and Pol. 499 (1973).
5. Minute No. 242, Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the
Salinity of the Colorado River, August 30,1973, United States-Mexico, 24 Stat. 1969, T.I.A.S.
No. 7708.
6. Lewis, Kaltofen, & Ormsby, supra note 1, at 26.
7. Id. at 28.
8. Kelly, supranote 3, at 15.
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across the border, they are reprimanded by federal agencies 9such as the
IBWC, who assert they are beyond their jurisdictional rights."
Justin Ward, spokesman for the NRDC, in his criticisms of the
EPA/SEDUE Draft Integrated Environmental Plan, observes:
[Mioreover, the draft does not address the documented limitations of the United States-Mexico International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC).
For instance, the discussion of the 'IBWC achievements in solving water quality issues' (pp. III-16, 21)
overlooks the Commission's historic failure to confront
'complex and hazardous problems of industrial discharges, toxic wastes, groundwater
mining and con1°
tamination, and air pollution.
Mary Kelly, in turn, notes that,
IBWC has been praised for its successful management
of surface reservoirs along the boundary and for its
resolution of boundary disputes. Recently, however, it
has become clear that the structure of IBWC and its
tendency to move cautiously are inadequate to the task
of managing the exploding water quality problems
along the United States-Mexico border.
IBWC has been very slow to exercise water quality
functions. In 1979, under a directive from Presidents
Carter and Lopez-Portillo, the IBWC adopted Minute
261, relating to 'border sanitation problems.' Article 3
of the 1944 Treaty provides that the two governments
shall give 'preferential attention to the solution of all
border sanitation problems.'
This cumbersome process has several limitations. First,
IBWC can proceed at its own discretion and is not
required to respond to problem situations. IBWC has
chosen, for whatever reasons, to move quite slowly on
those problems it has taken on. Second, there is no
mandate in either the 1944 Treaty or Minute 261 that
IBWC conduct advance planning to determine what
treatment works are likely to be necessary in the
future. Rather, the IBWC has tended to look into solutions only after serious problems have arisen and political pressure at the state or federal level has been
applied. One startling example of this lack of advance
planning is the absence of any sewage flow projections
versus capacity availability in the draft IBEP.n
9. Lewis, Kaltofen, & Ormsby, supranote 1, at 28.
10. Ward, supranote 3, at 9.
11. Kelly, supra note 3, at 15-19.
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The most severe criticism, however, has been levied on the third
point, namely, the IBWC's relatively closed approach to public participation in its decisionmaking. Helen Ingram, Director of the Udall Center for
Studies in Public Policy, notes,
The IBWC, which has been given significant oversight
over border water issues in the plan, has worked well
in the past when problems required engineers and
could be solved structurally. The increasing complexity of today's environmental problems, however, is a
direct result of more complex human problems. Historically the IBWC has narrowly interpreted its mandate, and there is little evidence to suggest that the
organization will be comfortable in open consultation
with nongovernmental organizations, with broad
gathering and interpretation of demographic and
social data, and projections of environmental consequences of land use decisions. The IBWC's penchant
for secrecy is antithetical to the
12 public participation
component of the border plan.
Mary Kelly, in similarly trenchant terms, argues, "the [IBWC's]
process fails to involve state and local governments in any formal role.
These entities have to depend solely on IBWC willingness to engage in
informal consultations or to respond to pressure from the respective fed13
eral government."
She goes on to say,
The IBWC is also a very closed agency. The opportunity for public participation is extremely limited and
there is a great reluctance to disclose information to the
public. The 1944 Treaty does not mandate public participation in the operations of the IBWC. In fact, it is
silent on public participation in IBWC decisionmaking
and on public access to information by the Commission. When TCPS requested information from the
IBWC United States Section on public participation in
Commission meetings, the IBWC responded that: 'The
meetings of the Commission are diplomatic communications of an international nature and therefore are not
open to the public'.

.

. This approach contrasts greatly

with the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, which established the International Joint Commission (IJC) ...

12. Ingram, supra note 1, at 5.
13. Kelly, supra note 3, at 15.
14. Kelly, supra note 3, at 16-17.
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Kelly's criticisms are echoed by Dick Kamp, who recommends
that,
The role of IBWC-CILA must be clarified to either
allow for much broader public participation in IBWC
planning and activities or to greatly limit their mandate to sanitation control issues. The latter is probably
preferable, but the addressing of shared water supply
issues is a very high and unaddressed priority in the
IBEP and IBWC had been very
closed to public partic1
ipation in the United States. y
These criticisms of the Commission lead to various recommendations for reform ranging from prescription that IBWC "aggressively promote transboundary cooperation" to recommendations such as Kamp's,
above, that would limit IBWC's authority over sanitation issues. The most
radical solution is advanced by TCPS which recommends "removal of
IBWC's lead jurisdiction on water quality problems in border area rivers
and underground water and transfer of that jurisdiction to a new binational agency that is open to public participation and accountable to bor16
der area governments."
Much of the environmentalist critique is familiar to veteran
observers of United States-Mexico transboundary environmental management. What is most interesting about the recommendations which follow the environmentalists' critiques of the IBWC is the emphasis on
functional reduction. This approach is genuinely new in discussions of the
Commission's role, functions, and performance in transboundary environmental management. In the past, critics of the Commission centered
their reform proposals on enhancements to the current management functions of the Commission, not subtractions.1 7 Underlying that approach
was at least a tacit assumption that the IBWC, while imperfect, represented an unusually well institutionalized approach to transboundary
environmental problem solving that could be incrementally molded to
address a substantial range of transboundary environmental questions.
Clearly, that has changed. Emboldened by the NAFTA debate, and frustrated with the pace of border reform, environmentalists are now ready to
take on the whole edifice of transboundary environmental management
with unprecedented zeal for functional reduction. Before examining the
merits of their criticisms and recommendations in greater detail, however,
let us look at the second dimension of the current round of arguments for
institutional change in United States-Mexico transboundary environmental management.
15. Kamp, supra note 3,at 2-3.
16. Kelly, supra note 3, at 17.
17. See, for example, Utton, Overview, 22 Nat. Resources J. 744-45 (1982).
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Critique of the 1983 La Paz Agreement
While specific criticisms have been levied at the IBWC, environmentalists aim broadly at reform of the present environmental management regime. A substantial concern is the perceived inadequacy of the
1983 United States-Mexico Border Environmental Cooperation Agreement (BECA), 18 also known as the La Paz Agreement, which establishes a
regular consultative framework for addressing binational environmental
problems. Criticisms of BECA range across a spectrum of concerns,
including, most prominently, 1) frustration with its noncomprehensive,
incremental approach to managing discrete problems, 2) a perception of
weak enforcement of BECA's existing Annexes (subsidiary agreements),
inadequate enforcement mechanisms, and inadequate interagency coordination under BECA, 3) inadequate allowances for public representation
and participation in planning and decisionmaking under BECA, and 4)
inadequate access to information under BECA.
On the first point, environmentalists are frustrated with the
framework agreement as such, noting that BECA lacks treaty status and
only amounts to a binational consultative framework rather than a comprehensive set of commitments to address the spectrum of binational
environmental problems. TCPS's Mary Kelly argues:
[T]he La Paz Agreement is an executive level agreement, which unlike a Treaty, does not require approval
by the United States Senate. The Agreement generally
does not contain specific timetables for action or commitments of funds or other resources to border environmental problems. Instead, the Agreement contains
a series of relatively vague promises for cooperative
action on the border environment...19
On the second point, enforcement, environmentalists are particularly critical. The NRDC's Justin Ward observes, "the current framework
in both the United States and Mexico is poorly equipped to deal with
international environmental enforcement." 20 The National Toxics Campaign, detailing a wide range of specific toxic and hazardous substances
abuses along the border, comments with specific reference to the maquiladora industry:
A United States-Mexico Treaty, the La Paz Agreement,
requires all industries that import chemicals to Mexico
to ship any resulting chemical wastes back to the coun18. Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in
the Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983 United States-Mexico, Tl.A.S. No. 10827 [hereinafter, Border
Environmental Cooperation Agreement].
19. Kelly, supra note 3, at 18.
20. Ward, supra note 3, at 9.
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try of origin. Yet according to EPA records of 1988,
fewer than one percent of maquiladoras reported
21
sending hazardous wastes back to the United States.
The TCPS, in turn, notes that,
The Agreement leaves many areas to be addressed
through separately negotiated 'Annexes'

. .

. The

Annexes do provide some basis for addressing more
specific problems. Nevertheless, with the exception of
Annex IV on copper smelter emissions reductions,
there has been little binational action to control polution sources in the border region. Rather, the Annexes
notification, or
generally provide for consultation,
22
exchange of information.
Environmentalists also fault the BECA for failing to make adequate provisions for including the public in planning and decisionmaking, and for inadequate provisions for informing the public on
environmental issues. The Udall Center's Helen Ingram comments,
The La Paz Agreement was a clear improvement over
previous bilateral arrangements because it involved
state government in working groups. But the groups
involved in making border environmental decisions
need to be expanded to include city and county governments, nongovernmental organizations, and academic institutions on both sides of the border... A

forum reflecting the multitude of interests along the
border should have the ability to examine the data and
to recognize emerging threats to environmental qualand track the implementation of
ity, and to monitor
23
regulations.
TCPS's Mary Kelly also observes that BECA's Article 16 "greatly
limits public availability of technical information obtained 'through the
implementation' of the Agreement." 24 These criticisms are echoed by Dick
Kamp who calls for a transborder public disclosure/right to know program for United States and Mexican agencies involved in environmental
25
affairs.
On the basis of such criticisms, several of the more activist environmental organizations have lobbied for BECA's wholesale replacement
by a treaty level mechanism providing for a new administrative system
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Lewis, Kaltofen, & Ormsby, supra note 1, at 1.
Kelly, supra note 3, at 19.
Ingram, supranote 3, at 5.
Kelly, supranote 3, at 19.
Kamp, supranote 3, at 3-4.
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endowed with greater enforcement powers and improved public accountability systems.
TCPS, for instance, proposes,
[Tlhe 1983 La Paz Agreement should be renegotiated
and elevated to treaty level. The agreement should be
revised to more directly involve state and local government representatives and to allow for public participation and access to information in both countries. In
addition, the vague commitments in the current agreement should be revised to provide for specific timetables and actions. Elevating the agreement to treaty
status would help ensure enforceability and followthrough on the obligations undertaken...
A new binational agency to deal with transboundary
natural resource and environmental problems in the
United States/Mexico border area should be created as
part of any free trade agreement. This agency could
have authority for monitoring and enforcement in a
variety of transboundary environmental and natural
resource areas, including groundwater management,
hazardous substances control, emergency response
and contingency planning, water pollution and air pollution. The governing board of the new agency should
include representatives of state and local governments
community organizations on both sides of the borand 26
der.
The BEP adopts a similar approach, but centers its recommendations on drafting an improved Integrated Border Environmental Plan
(IBEP) that effectively amends the BECA framework. Among BEP recommendations are: the negotiation of a new environmental treaty with Mexico which, at minimum, invests the IBEP with treaty status; extending the
jurisdiction of the IBEP to encompass areas beyond BECA's 100 kilometer
reach on either side of the border; and the creation of binational councils at
the local and regional levels which, in turn, would constitute an "integrated border environmental council" legally empowered to meet with
EPA and SEDUE on a regular basis "to identify problems, seek funding
and resources, and generally be a partner in the effective implementation
of the plan-including monitoring and enforcement where possible--on a
local/regional level.,27
The NRDC takes a somewhat broader, trinational, approach. It
recommends the creation of a new North American Commission on Trade
and Environment with a comprehensive mandate to address NAFTA26. Kelly, supra note 3, at 19-20.
27. Kamp, supra note 3, at 2.
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related problems throughout the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Such
a commission should be composed of governmental and nongovernmental experts from all three signatories to the NAFTA. It should be empowered to hear complaints from governments, non-governmental
organizations, and citizens regarding the failure of any signatory to
enforce its own environmental standards or applicable international
norms on trade-related activities.28 The NRDC notes:
The Commission should investigate allegations of
poor enforcement and should issue findings and recommendations to the NAFTA parties. The Commission would serve an important function by calling
attention to problem areas; it should also be given limited powers to enjoin polluting activities that violate
applicable standards. The Commission should also
make recommendations on needed improvements in
national policies to prevent any country from gaining
competitive trade advantages through comparatively
weak standards of enforcement.
Experience with other international monitoring and
compliance regimes illustrates basic elements that
should govern institutional reforms under the border
plan and related processes. These elements include a
positive role for nongovernmental organizations, provisions for extensive monitoring and penalizing compliance lapses, participation of impartial experts
within compliance review and enforcement,
29 and full
disclosure of documents and proceedings.
In sum, the pattern of critique and recommendations with respect
to the 1983 Border Environmental Cooperation Agreement demonstrates a
tendency to jettison BECA in favor of an alternative treaty. Recommendations currently range from functional expansion under the La Paz Agreement,30 to potential revisions of the treaty itself,3 1 to more rejectionist
approaches. 32 Of the various critiques of the La Paz Agreement, those of
the BEP and TCPS are the most extensive. Both view the La Paz Agreement as essentially obsolete, lacking mechanisms for adequate participation and enforcement of environmental norms and programs agreed upon
by the two countries, and lacking sufficient standing in law (since it is an
executive agreement). As for the recommended alternatives of those who
would reject the agreement, these range from a North American Environ28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Ward, supra note 3, at 10-11.
Ward, supra note 3, at 11.
Lewis, Kaltofen, & Ormsby, supranote 3.
Ingram, supranote 3.
Ward, supra note 3; Kelly, supranote 3; Kamp, supra note 3.
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mental Commission 33 to inclusion of a new agreement-perhaps the IBEP
itself-as part of NAFTA,3534 to reaching a separate treaty on bilateral environmental management.
The Recommendations: A Critical Appraisal
As noted above, a distinctive feature of the range of reform proposals generated by the Free Trade Agreement and IBEP discussions is the
emphasis on functional reduction or rejection of extant arrangements for
managing transboundary environmental problems. The most critical proposals share several basic tendencies: 1) a concern with "comprehensive
environmental management," 2) a concern with administrative integration and coordination, 3) a concern for effective enforcement, and 4) a concern for enhanced participation by nontraditional actors (e.g., local
governments, nongovernmental organizations, and academic organizations) and better access to information. Virtually all these proposals are
highly skeptical of, if not preferring to reject, several basic features of environmental management which are part of the extant arrangement, namely,
1) incrementalism, 2) ad hoc planning, 3) multi-institutionalism and overlapping jurisdictions.
Unquestionably, the current "conjuncture" brought about the
joint presidential initiatives in trade and environmental planning provides an unprecedented opportunity for policy reform. In this environment, it may be politically feasible to move more dramatically in the
direction of "comprehensive environmental management" than ever
before. Understandably, this is what environmental organizations strive to
achieve, for it optimizes the potential for environmental protection and
natural resource conservation.
Even so, it is a useful exercise to step back from the situational
aspects of the present "conjuncture" and reflect on what the barriers and
drawbacks might be in pursuing the "functional reduction/institutional
excision" approach to environmental reform along the border. Several
critical questions need to be asked, or faced, by advocates of radical surgery on the institutional apparatus for transboundary environmental
management. At minimum, we should ask, is radical surgery politically
feasible? Second, would radical surgery contribute to strengthened institutional management of environmental problems along the border? Third,
are there alternative courses of action which can produce reasonable
results-functional enhancement, for instance, within the present institutional context?

33. Ward, supra note 1.
34. Ward, supra note 1; Kelly, supra note 1; Kamp, supranote 1.
35. Kamp, supra note 1; Kelly, supranote 1.
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Political Feasibility of Functional Reduction
The most radical of the proposals above all aim at some form of
functional reduction with respect to the roles and functions of the IBWC
and the La Paz framework agreement. My own, hopefully well considered
view, is that advocates of functional reduction will encounter serious, and
likely insurmountable, political resistance to achieving these reforms. This
is not a value judgment about what "ought" to be, it is a devil's advocate
judgment concerning the difficulties of achieving functional reduction.
Let us consider the case of the IBWC first, and the La Paz Agreement second.
IBWC. The fundamental problem with an approach which
reduces the powers and functions of the commission is that it runs afoul of
one of the most cohesive political alliances ever fashioned in defense of a
natural resource entitlement in the United States. The IBWC's current
jurisdictions and functions in the sphere of environmental management
principally derive from interpretation of Article 3 of the 1944 United
States-Mexico Water Treaty 36 which mandates that IBWC have jurisdiction over all "border sanitation problems."
It is important to reflect on what this means. It means that the
IBWC's mandate to address water quality problems is anchored in a treaty
level document, which invests the commission with greater authority
than that found in lesser international agreements to which the United
States is party, and domestic legislation. It is the nature of the 1944 Treaty
mandate, however, that is most interesting in this case. The 1944 Water
Treaty is mainly concerned with apportioning water resources-or, put
another way, rationing entitlements--on the major transboundary watercourses, the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers. The treaty itself was put
together with great difficulty and is a contender for the most politically
complicated international water agreement ever agreed upon by United
States states.37 The critical nature of this document in apportioning interstate and binational water resources on the Colorado River, in particular,
makes it an unusually difficult agreement to revise. If anything, the difficulty of undertaking a revision has intensified due to rising demands on
the water stock of border rivers and interstate negotiations aimed at reallocating water within the Colorado River watershed. It is precisely this
long-standing historical linkage of water quality management to water
allocation both within the United States proper and between the United
States and Mexico that makes any revision to the 1944 Water Treaty such a
delicate political undertaking.
36. Treaty regarding Utilization of Waters of Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio
Grande, February 3, 1944, United States-Mexico, Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994 [hereinafter 1944
Water Treaty].
37. See, N. Hundley, Dividing the Waters (1966).
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This, of course, does not mean that a revision to the 1944 Water
Treaty, stripping IBWC of its water quality management functions, is
inconceivable. The key, however, is finding a way to do so without jeopardizing national and binational water entitlements. The least risky
approach would be to simply employ the channel of the IBWC itself,
through its minutes, to reduce its functional involvement. The commission itself would hardly champion this approach, but functional reduction
could be accomplished without altering the Treaty per se. Altering the
Treaty as such is more risky. Currently the initiative to revise the 1944
Water Treaty is coming from nongovernmental and academic organizations interested in better transboundary management, and not from the
state-level organizations which carry the most clout in influencing their
congressional delegations in this respect. The state governments will inevitably weigh the merits of working within the present arrangement for
transboundary management of the environment against the risks associated with opening up the 1944 Water Treaty. If the past may be taken as
even a partial guide to the future, one would
need to be skeptical of the
38
states' readiness to amend the 1944 Treaty
At present, United States border and basin states might be
tempted to consider a reduction of the IBWC's functions under certain
conditions. One essential condition is that Mexico not attempt to amend
its treaty entitlement to water on the two rivers, or strengthen its claim to
water quality on those rivers. Another, less essential, but important condition is maintaining the IBWC's mandate to manage water allocation and
reclamation functions under the 1944 Treaty. If these conditions are met,
then it might be possible to create a package of institutional and economic
incentives whereby the United States and Mexico would transfer the
Commission's water quality functions to some other, perhaps newly created, agency.
La Paz Agreement
From a political standpoint, the two countries are likely to find it
much easier to amend or replace the La Paz Agreement, since this agreement is basically a nation to nation executive protocol. While it is
grounded in domestic political bargains in the United States, it is not
linked to any allocative or distributive principle which might generate the
perception of great risk should it undergo revision, nor would revision as
38. Recently, the Governor of the state of Colorado fired his two senior water advisors for
merely suggesting that new proposals for rationing water entitlements in the Colorado River
basin be reviewed. See, Sleeth, Dismissal Stuns Engineer, Denver Post 2-C (February 16,
1992); Romer fired engineer to help river compact, Rocky Mountain News 39 (February 16,
1992). This traditional reluctance to risk any aspect of a state's position in the complex entitlement system along the Colorado River is an indication of how difficult it will be to change
the 1944 Water Treaty.
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an executive agreement require the approval of two-thirds of the United
States Senate.
All that changes, of course, should the two countries seek to elevate the La Paz Agreement, or any substitute, to treaty status. While a
detailed analysis is beyond the scope of the present paper, it is by no
means clear that the complex regulatory questions raised by such a treaty
initiative could be resolved to the satisfaction of the affected states or win
the financial support of other United States states who, depending on the
funding formula, might well be expected to subsidize environmental amelioration along the United States-Mexico border.
Such a treaty may also prove difficult to achieve due to resistance
Mexico.
Proponents of reform 39 are strong advocates of a freedom of
from
information/full public disclosure rule within any agreement. Such freedom of information rules run fully against the grain of past Mexican public administration and are bound to be controversial there.40 It is doubtful
whether the Mexican government will accede to such reforms in the
present political climate.
Strengthening Institutional Management
Debate over alternative institutional approaches should be
guided, in part, by the consideration of whether the proposed course of
action contributes towards or diminishes institutionalized management of
environmental problems and conservation of natural resources in the border region. While any discussion of the institutional impacts of the various
functional reductionist recommendations is hypothetical at best, several
considerations must be borne in mind.
First, the record of institution building in managing problems in
United States-Mexican affairs has been spotty at best for the better part of
two centuries of bilateral relations. It is instructive, particularly from a
functionalist perspective, to note that since the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, the two countries have achieved only one treaty level agreement
establishing a permanent organization to manage a functional arena of
public policy, and that happens to the IBWC. While a number of other
commissions have been created by executive agreement to cope with
problems ranging from trade to immigration, these have been temporary,
or semi-permanent bodies, often of a more explicitly political character,
which lacked the capacity for functional enhancement or institutional
growth.

39. See, Kamp, supra note 3; Kelly, supra note 3.
40. For discussion of this point, see, R Camp, Intellectuals and the State in Twentieth-Century Mexico 179 (1985); Poitras, Welfare Bureaucracyand Clientele Politicsin Mexico, 18 Admin.
Sci. Q. 21-22 (1973).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 32

That cannot be taken, in itself, as a argument against the functional reductionists, since functional reduction is generally accompanied
by preference for a treaty level commitment to transboundary environmental management. As seen above, however, the political likelihood of
realizing such a treaty is slim. If that, indeed, is the case, then the risks of
functional reduction are increased by the generally poor bilateral record of
binational institution building.
Second, political conditions in both countries work against institution building in bilateral relations. In the United States, a federal system
of government increases the difficulty of forging the broad gauged coalitions that are necessary for empowering executive action in diplomatic
affairs. 41 In Mexico, a tradition of de facto political centralism and strong
executism are blunted by term limitations on presidential office-the sexenio, or single nonrenewable six year incumbency-which creates an
unusual degree of administrative disruption and discontinuities in implementation and enforcement of formal rules.42 In the United States, the
problems of forging bilateral institutions tend to be centered on the input
side of the political process, or policy formulation dimension of the political process. In Mexico, the problems of institution building are centered
on the output side of the system, or implementation side of the policy process. Such fundamental differences in political procedures are barriers to
creating and sustaining strong cooperative binational institutions.
Third, fundamental differentials in economic development, even
assuming the arguable benefits of free trade over the long term, are
impediments to binational institution building. For the foreseeable future,
Mexico is likely to lack the assets to commit to all dimensions of environmental amelioration and enforcement along the border. It must be borne
in mind that Mexico has, historically, committed more resources to environmental improvement in border areas than in most parts of its interior,
largely due to United States pressures for environmental remediation and
regulation in the border zone. Even so, there are practical limits to Mexico's capacity to invest in these functions in the near to medium term, and
very likely in the long term. As Roberto Sanchez argues, Mexico conceptualizes environmental management
and prioritizes its needs differently
43
than the United States.
Mexico has, and is likely to continue to give, border environmental remediation a lower priority than activists in the border region would
like. Its resource limitations and policy preferences thus function as a basic
41. Bath, The Emerging Environmental Crisis along the United States-Mexico Border in
Changing Boundaries in the Americas 120 (L. Herzog, ed. 1992).
42. On this point, see, M. Grindle, Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Peasants in Mexico 164-72
(1977); Report of the Bilateral Commissions on the Future of United States-Mexican Relations, The Challenge of Interdependence: Mexico and the United States 26-27 (1989).
43. R. Sanchez, El Medio Ambiente como Fuente de Conflicto en la Relacion Binacional
Mexico-Estados Unidos 113-114 (1990).
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constraint on rapid or dramatic jumps in institutional commitments to
environmental improvement.
In sum, enduring obstacles litter the path toward improvement in
United States-Mexican environmental management. It is precisely these
kinds of considerations that should make reformers wary of efforts which
center on functional reductionism, or efforts to remake existing institutional arrangements along the border. Notwithstanding their flaws, current institutional arrangements have the virtue of having been achieved in
the face of these constraints and representing compromises that are essentially compatible with the diplomatic limitations arising from each
nation's polity and economy.
Alternative Courses of Action
If radical surgery on border institutions is politically difficult, as it
is, and institutionally risky, as it is, are there alternative courses of action?
The answer here is clearly yes. While approaches in this vein fall within
what might be called the "conventional wisdom" of transboundary environmental management, it is worth considering at least what is possible in
this realm.
IBWC. It is useful here to examine the IBWC's general capabilities
as well as what can be done in several of the "problem areas" identified by
critics of the commission's management approach. We shall consider the
general issues of functional development and reduction, the problems of
planning, enforcement, and participation in the area of water quality.
First, it is worth noting that the nature of the commission's mandate in the realm of water quality is elastic. It is grounded in an interpretation of the 1944 Water Treaty, carefully extrapolated over the years. Such
agreements, while limited in scope, do have considerable force. What is
more, they remain malleable within the present institutional and political
context. This, of course, is a point of contention with critics who argue that
the commission's performance is inadequate. However, there is nothing in
the present institutional context which formally prevents the two governments from proceeding with further interpretation of the treaty by mutual
consent. Indeed, either functional development or functional reduction is
possible through this process, bypassing the need to resort to treaty
amendment to achieve change in water quality management.
It is useful to consider what might be possible within the present
institutional arrangement in responding to concerns of the commission's
critics. Critics note that the commission has command of its agenda and
has no imperative to engage in comprehensive planning, or to anticipate
long range occurrences and needs in water quality management along the
border. While it is true that the commission has some discretion in practice, the critics have overdrawn this point. In fact, there is nothing in the
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1944 Treaty document which would prevent the two governments from
conferring on the commission a planning mandate of this type. In fact, it is
well within the two governments' reach to interpret the language of the
treaty's Article 24, Section A to require such a planning component. Article
24, Section A empowers the IBWC "to initiate and carry on investigations
and develop plans for the works which are to be constructed or established in accordance with the provisions of this and other treaties or agreements in force between the two countries dealing with boundaries and
international waters." 44 At this juncture, the two government's have not
deemed fit to pursue such a course, though the IBEP's water quality/
water conservation and wastewater implementation plans set out in Secincreased long range planning in these subtion V.11-23 do contemplate
45
stantive issue-areas.
In the case of enforcement, the critics are correct when they argue
that IBWC has not been greatly engaged in enforcing various agreements.
Such lassitude in enforcement, however, is not a problem which can be
attributed to faults in the treaty as such. On contrary, it is more a reflection
of the inherent diplomatic constraints associated with binational environmental management. Under the 1944 Water Treaty, the IBWC is endowed
with administrative responsibility on a case-by-case basis and must rely
on domestic agencies and courts of each government to actually implement its findings with respect to the parties' compliance.
While the commission's leadership has in the past resisted taking
on a more aggressive regulatory role for the agency, there is nothing in the
1944 Water Treaty which would otherwise prevent the two governments
from reaching a subsidiary agreement, or minute, as the commission's
journals are known, conferring additional regulatory powers on the commission in the domain of water quality management. Language in Article
24, Section C delegates to the IBWC the power, "in general to exercise and
discharge the specific powers and duties entrusted to the commission by
this and other treaties and agreements in force between the two countries,
and to carry into execution and prevent the violation of the provisions of
those treaties and agreements. The authorities of each country shall aid
and support the exercise and discharge of these powers and duties, and
each commissioner shall invoke when necessary the jurisdiction of the
to aid in the execution
courts or other appropriate agencies of his country
46
and enforcement of these powers and duties."
Such general language is open to further elaboration and specification. By mutual agreement the two nations could stipulate that the com44. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 33.
45. United States Environmental Protection Agency and Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano
y Ecologia, Integrated Environmental Plan for the United States-Mexico Border Area, First
Stage 1992-1994 (1992).
46. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 33.
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mission undertake direct inspections rather than rely on other domestic
agencies, and confer on the IBWC specific powers in relation to other
domestic agencies.
In the case of participation, the critics are clearly on target in faulting the commission for failing to respond effectively to emerging
demands along the border or include nontraditional actors, such as NGOs
in its planning process. This is a legitimate criticism and is grounded in
the 1944 Water Treaty which is silent on the question of public participation. Articles 2 and 24 treat the commission's formal meetings as diplomatic occurrences, thus reinforcing a pattern of confidentiality and
secrecy with respect to deliberations and the management of information
resources. 4 7 Here again, however, the commission's behavior could be
altered by mutual government agreement without recourse to treaty
amendment. Language in Article 2 or 24 could be interpreted to require
the commission to consult, provide information to the public, and conduct
public hearings or other fora which would admit public input in its decisionmaking. In particular, Article 24, Section A, quoted above, could be
interpreted to require consultation or hearings with nontraditional organizations.
In sum, the various critics tend to overlook the inherent opportunities of the IBWC framework in favor of more dramatic change. Yet the
political possibilities of reaching such an extension of the IBWC's authority following the proven if frustrating pathway of functional enhancement
are actually more favorable to reform.

THE LA PAZ AGREEMENT

The La Paz Agreement likewise provides a flexible mechanism for
reaching binational agreement on international environmental issues.
While critics are correct in arguing that a binational treaty would be far
superior to the present framework, the real chances for obtaining such a
treaty are, in this analyst's opinion, slim. It is useful, then to consider what
might be done within the present framework.
The bulk of the criticism of the La Paz Agreement is similar in
form to charges levied at the IBWC. Critics are concerned with the 1) incremental, ad hoc character of reaching concrete agreements; 2) lack of
enforcement provisions built into the La Paz administrative structure coupled to the administrative weaknesses of the executive agreement itself; 3)
limitations on information and participation inherent in the framework;
and 4) poor coordination among the various agencies in each country with
mandates in this field. Such criticisms are valid. The key question is, if a
47. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 33.
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treaty cannot be reached, can progress yet be made under the La Paz
Agreement? The short answer is yes, it can.
On the first point, there is little real chance of avoiding an incremental, ad hoc approach to transboundary environmental management if
the present structure of the La Paz document is maintained. The intent of
the La Paz Agreement was precisely to allow a great deal of flexibility to
the member governments in selecting approaches to transboundary environmental management. Within the structure of the La Paz Agreement,
however, it is possible to coordinate and link the various provisions of its
subsidiary agreements in a manner that would approximate a more comprehensive approach to transboundary management. In effect, this is what
the IBEP process is aiming at. While this solution is-to purloin a term
from decisionmaking theorist Herbert Simon-a "satisfying" approach,
environmentalists should seriously explore its possibilities as a second
best, but more achievable approach towards comprehensive binational
environmental planning.
Let us turn to the question of enforcement. Enforcement under the
1983 agreement is almost entirely a function of whatever mechanisms are
built into its subsidiary "Annexes," as the implementing agreements are
called. If adequate enforcement is not built into the annex, it is not likely to
be realized. This is the necessary, if not the sufficient, condition. On the
other hand, the La Paz Agreement does not preclude vigorous enforcement. While some critics seem to believe it is itself an obstacle, it is only an
obstacle insofar as it is compared to the ideal objective of a binational
treaty To view the agreement this way may be a case of letting the perfect
become the enemy of the good. The challenge confronting the environmental organizations is to hold their governments accountable, to ensure
that these enforcement arrangements are written into the annexes agreed
upon. The agreement also functions as a more flexible document. While a
formal treaty would undoubtedly be a stronger instrument for enforcement, it also lacks flexibility Under the current arrangement, subsidiary
agreements are more amendable, more reversible. There are some virtues
in that.
With respect to the issue of participation and access to information, the La Paz Agreement does not preclude further elaboration and
extension of guarantees of participation and access to non-traditional constituencies. This is a crucial and necessary modification without which the
agreement will fail to satisfy border constituencies and the prospects for
more effective management will diminish. Under the present arrangement stipulated in Article 9 of the agreement, states and municipalities
may be invited to participate in the meetings of the National Coordinators
as well as representatives of "international governmental or nongovernmental organizations."48 To date, state representatives have been included
48. Border Environmental Cooperation Agreement, supra note 17, Article 9.
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in the four working groups under the agreement. Article 9 could, however, be interpreted in a subsequent annex to permit regular participation
by nontraditional actors.
Some movement in this direction is contemplated by the IBEP
plan released in February 1992. Under the IBEP First Stage (1992-94) provisions, Border Environmental Plan Public Advisory Committees (BEPPACs) are to be chartered in Mexico and the United States for the purpose
of advising their respective national environmental agencies on border
problems. 49 These groups are "encouraged by SEDUE and EPA to meet
periodically, freely exchange ideas, and make joint recommendations to
both SEDUE and EPA." 50 The BEPPACs, according to EPA officials, will
operate on the national, regional, and municipal levels to advise BECA's
National Coordinators on environmental problems. 5 1 The plan also
encourages the development of sister city intergovernmental advisory
groups at the municipal level to help advise on nonurban environmental
programs, as well as the involvement of people-to-people binational com52
munity groups in promoting public awareness of environmental issues.
Finally, the plan provides that, "State and local environmental agencies
will be invited to provide their extensive knowledge, expertise, and
resources to the plan by encouraging their involvement and participation
in the binational Work Groups constituted by SEDUE and EPA pursuant
to the 1983 Border Environmental Agreement. Particularly on the United
States side, state and local governments play a significant role in carrying
out federal53mandates; therefore, their direct and active involvement is
essential."
Environmentalists have criticized the IBEP's provisions for
expanded participation on grounds that the plan is at minimum unclear
on just how the BEPPACs' advice would be incorporated into actual planning activities, that the process directs advise to EPA and SEDUE, each of
which suffers from limited enforcement and regulatory authority, and that
BEPPAC membership is based on a process of nominations and EPA/
SEDUE selection rather than local election. 54 Whether the BEPPACs and
related provisions of the plan provide an adequate mechanism or not,
however, considerable elaboration of the participatory opportunities
available to border organizations is possible within the 1983 agreement's
language.

49. Environmental Protection Agency and Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologia,

supra note 40.
50. Id. at V-47.
51. R. Kiy, Comments made during briefing for Border States' Educational Project at the
Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. (May 2, 1992).
52. Id. at V-46.
53. Id. at V-46.
54. Kelly, supra note 3; Kamp, supra note 3.
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With respect to access to information, the present arrangement
under the La Paz Agreement, as Mary Kelly observes, 55 does vest discretion as to the dissemination of such information in the National Coordinators. Article 16 states "such information may be made available to third
parties by mutual agreement of the parties to this agreement." 56 There is
nothing in this language which would prevent the parties to the agreement from extending full access to information to third parties (nontraditional actors) in a supplementary annex, however. In fact, the new IBEP
does commit the two countries to a program of expanded access to information on environmental conditions and regulations along the border,
providing that,
SEDUE and EPA will develop educational and information programs about the Border environmental plan
57

SEDUE and EPA will publish a SEDUE/EPA approved
English language translation of the 1988 Mexican
Comprehensive General Ecology Law, the regulations
and technical norms or standards developed to implement the law, and such other Mexican and United
States laws, regulations, standards and guidance as
SEDUE and EPA deem appropriate. The relevant
United States laws, regulations, standards and guidance will be translated into Spanish. These publications will be regularly updated.58
SEDUE and EPA will jointly arrange for the publication of triennial environmental indices and data on the
border area. SEDUE and EPA will seek establishment
of requirements for public availability of data on emissions and effluents of pollutants and other elements
of
59
a right-to-know program in the border area.
This commitment falls well short of the kind of broad-gauged
access to technical data and administrative information border environmentalists would like to have, but does mark a point of departure in
enhancing the availability of vital information which will assist environmental groups in holding government agencies accountable and identifying and monitoring important environmental trends. What is more, it
illustrates that a good deal, in fact, can be accomplished extrapolating
more broadly from the language of BECA's Article 16.
55. Kelly, supra note 3.
56. Border Environmental Cooperation Agreement, supra note 17, art. 16.
57. United States Environmental Protection Agency and Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano

y Ecology, supra note 40, at V-48.
58. Id. at V-48.
59. Id. at V-49.
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Finally, critics have expressed concern with the lack of interagency coordination, overlapping jurisdictions, and jurisdictional ambiguities contained in the present approach. Viewed strictly from the perspective of administrative efficiency, such conflicts and ambiguities are
certainly inefficient and suboptimal in allocating resources to administrative objectives. It bears noting that the IBEP regards this issue as a considerable problem and emphasizes the need for better interagency
coordination in the planning process, though it falls short on specifying
how that might be accomplished in the many issue areas at stake.6
The La Paz document, however, does allow the two countries to
move towards greater rationalization of their administrative approaches.
A variety of problems will continue to arise, however, due to the structure
of binational relations. Some problems arise simply as a function of federalism in the United States and the differences in administrative
approaches to environmental management at the level of the various
states. Similar dynamics are now occurring in Mexico as its government
moves to decentralize certain aspects of environmental administration
and law. Other problems arise due to the varying administrative capacities of the various agencies of the two federal governments. The IBWC is a
good case in point with its special mandate in the area of water quality.
Despite these structural difficulties in United States-Mexican relations,
incremental refinements can be stipulated through annexes to the La Paz
Agreement.
The current arrangement is not all to the worst, however. While
we are far from having a perfectly rationalized administrative structure
for dealing with all transboundary environmental and natural resource
management issues, there is a good deal of redundancy built into the system. Redundancy, in the form of overlapping jurisdiction, is frequently an
excuse for inaction, but it may also provide a choice of pathways to
address complex problems, problems that are complex politically as well
as technically. Again, the challenge to environmental critics is to define the
need for better administrative coordination and to hold the governments
accountable at various levels.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The purpose of this paper has been two-fold, to delineate the
range of views of current critics of the United States-Mexico environmental management regime as well as proposals for change, and to argue that
60. For a brief discussion of this point, see, J. Rich, Planning the Border's Future: The Mexican-United States Integrated Border Environmental Plan (1992); Texas Center for Policy
Studies, A Response to the EPA/SEDUE Integrated Border Environmental Plan (March
1992).
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there are useful alternatives to the radical surgery some critics presently
support as the solution to transboundary environmental management.
The current round of criticism and debate on the extant management
regime has been extraordinarily refreshing and contributed a great deal of
useful "new thinking"-with apologies to Sen. Gary Hart-on what
should be done.
While there is much that merits serious consideration in environmentalists' criticisms of the current management approach, one should
remain skeptical of the prospects for reaching a bilateral environmental
treaty, or including all but the most elementary principles of environmental responsibility in a forthcoming NAFTA. Should these objectives fail to
materialize, environmental organizations must be prepared to take advantage of the current institutional framework and other suboptimal reforms
such as those contemplated in the IBEP.
The thrust of these remarks tilt away from the functional reduction approach in favor of the more traditional approach of functional
enhancement to existing institutions. It is obvious that should radical surgery fail, there is much to be done in the context of the present institutional framework. Critics have not yet taken the IBWC's framework
seriously, or attempted to generate an effective coalition for changing its
behavior. That is the essential prerequisite. The IBWC's mandate does provide for substantial elaboration, but the political pressure must first be
directed in the right channels.
Similarly, the La Paz Agreement, with all its imperfections, offers
considerable latitude for change. Indeed, from a political standpoint, there
are far fewer obstacles to its revision or replacement than to achieving a
treaty The current IBEP, while flawed in many respects, essentially adopts
this approach. It is fundamentally a functional enhancement document of
the traditional sort. While one may agree with a great many of the specific
charges levied at the shortcomings of the IBEP, the plan is designed to fit
within the present framework of extant management arrangements and
build incrementally upon them. As such, it offers more achievable opportunities and goals than many of its critics.
In sum, this paper argues for taking another look at what is possible within the current management regime with an eye towards extending
and institutionalizing that regime in the interest of both nations and the
border environment. There is no doubt that economic integration will
accelerate and place the border environment under greater stress. If environmentalists cannot persuade their governments to adopt a comprehensive regime, they must utilize the remaining options effectively.
Fortunately, the current level of executive attention in the context of the
progress of the past decade affords a variety of options for functional
development in environmental management.

